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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
CASENO.20060874-CA
Plaintiff,
vs.
SHAWN DAVID LARSON,
Defendant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION
Appellant, SHAWN DAVID LARSON ("Mr. Larson"), appeals from the
denial of his motion to dismiss pursuant to 120-day disposition and the Sentence,
Judgment, and Order for Commitment. This Court has appellate jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
ISSUE 1: Did the trial court err in denying Mr. Larson's motion to dismiss
the charges pursuant to the speedy trial statute, Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1 (now
repealed)?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court's denial of Mr. Larson's
motion to dismiss is reviewed for abuse of discretion, its factual conclusions for
clear error and its legal conclusions for correctness. State v. Wagenman, 71 P.3d

184, 186 (Utah App. 2003); State v. Mahi, 125 P.3d 103, 105 (Utah App. 2005).
"An appellate court will find abuse of discretion only where there is no reasonable
basis in the record to support the trial court's speedy trial statute determination of
good cause.9' State v. Wagenman, 71 P.3d at 186.
ISSUE 2: Was Mr. Larson denied his constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel when his trial counsel did not diligently pursue timely
bringing the case to trial?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: When a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is raised for the first time on appeal, this Court resolves the issue as a
matter of law. State v. Mahi, 125 P.3d 103, 105 (Utah App. 2005).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 10, 2003, Mr. Larson was charged with eleven counts of
Aggravated Robbery with gang enhancements, each a first degree felony, and one
second degree felony count of Purchase, Transfer, Possession or Use of a Firearm
by a Restricted Person. Rl-6. At the time, Mr. Larson was serving a commitment
at the Utah State Prison on another case for which he was released on January 13,
2004. R416:102.
A Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending Charges dated April 18,
2003 was delivered to the Warden on May 5, 2003. R21-3 (Addendum A);
R416:55. A preliminary hearing was scheduled for June 10, 2003 (R19-20), at
which time counsel for both parties stipulated to a continuance. R24-5.
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Counsel subsequently stipulated twice more to a continuance of the
preliminary hearing because the prosecutor anticipated the federal government
would file charges against Mr. Larson for the offenses in this case. R26-9. The
preliminary hearing was scheduled for both August 27, 2003 and on the "backup
date of October 8, 2003. R409:2-3. On August 27, 2003, Mr. Larson was
transported from the prison, but his counsel failed to appear and was consequently
held in contempt. R30-31, 35-9 (Addendum B). Over Mr. Larson's objections,
the court found that because defense counsel had failed to appear, defense counsel
had waived Mr. Larson's right to a speedy trial. R31-3.
The preliminary hearing was finally conducted and all of the charges were
bound over on October 8, 2003, although the court found insufficient evidence to
bind over the gang enhancements. R42-5. The State subsequently filed an
amended information adding an additional first degree felony charge for
Aggravated Robbery. R51-5. Mr. Larson pleaded "not guilty" to the charges on
October 20, 2003, and a jury trial was scheduled for November 18-20, 2003. R4850. Defense counsel filed a motion and stipulation for a continuance of the jury
trial on November 7, 2003, so the defense could retain a DNA expert. R56. At a
pretrial conference on November 10, 2003, the trial was rescheduled to March 246,2004. R59-61.
On February 10, 2004, defense counsel filed a Motion and Stipulation for
Continuance of the jury trial on the ground that the defense's DNA expert needed

3

more time to evaluate the DNA evidence. R97. On February 20, 2004 jthe jury
trial was rescheduled to June 8-10, 2004. R105-07.
At a pretrial conference conducted on May 24, 2004, the trial court
informed Mr. Larson that he had already waived his request for 120-day
disposition, at which time Mr. Larson indicated he wanted to fire his counsel and
requested 60 days to retain another attorney. R129-130. On June 28, 2004, the
matter was referred back to Salt Lake Legal Defenders for the appointment of new
counsel. Rl35-36.
On July 14, 2004, James Valdez entered an appearance as counsel for Mr.
Larson and the matter was set for a hearing on Mr. Larson's motion for 120-day
disposition on August 4, 2004. R147-50. Mr. Larson subsequently filed a Motion
to Dismiss Pursuant to Defendant's Demand for Disposition Pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. 77-29-5. R158-9, 161-4, 230-36 (Addendum C). The trial court
denied Mr. Larson's motion to dismiss on August 13, 2004 and entered its
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Court Order on September 29, 2004.
R224-6; R238-42 (Addendum D). Mr. Larson's counsel then filed a motion to
continue the trial to allow him time to prepare for DNA evidence, to which motion
the State objected. R228-9.
At the pretrial conference on November 29, 2004, Mr. Larson fired Mr.
Valdez and the trial date was stricken so Mr. Larson's as yet unretained counsel
could have time to review the case. R257-8. The State filed an Objection to
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Further Appointment of Counsel. R276-91. On December 13, 2004, Mr. Larson
requested additional time for his family to retain private counsel. R292-3.
On January 3, 2005, Mr. Larsen filed a pro se "Motion to Appeal Judge
Barratt's Decision of Ruling on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Pursuant to
120 Day Disposition Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1," stating that he was seeking "to
have the [] case appealed in the Utah Supreme Court, State of Utah . . . " R302-10
(Addendum E). The minute entry from a hearing on January 3, 2005 indicates
that the trial court "addressed the appeal filed by [Mr. Larson], stating no appeal
could be addressed until there was a trial." R321.
On January 18, 2005, attorney D. Christopher VanCampen entered an
appearance on behalf of Mr. Larson. R324. The minute entry from a hearing
conducted on January 24, 2005 indicates that Mr. Larson waived his right to a
speedy trial. R328-9. On February 14, 2005, the State dismissed Counts 4-13 and
Mr. Larson pled guilty to three counts of Aggravated Robbery pursuant to State v.
Sery1 so he could "pursu[e] his rights to appeal." R340 (336-45) (Addendum F).
Mr. Larson was sentenced to prison six years to life on April 4, 2005 on
each count, consecutive. R345-6. However, Mr. VanCampen never filed a Notice
of Appeal. Thus, on November 8, 2005, Mr. Larson filed, pro se, a Motion for
Reinstatement of Direct Appeal; Motion for Appointment of Counsel, wherein he

758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988).
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requested reinstatement of his right to direct appeal pursuant to State v. Manning
and formally requested a hearing. R349-52, 356 (Addendum G). In its Minute
Entry and Order denying Mr. Larson's motion dated March 23, 2006, the trial
court noted that Mr. Larson's pro se motion had an incorrect caption and a copy
was not provided to the district attorney. R359-61 (Addendum H).
The court further stated that Mr. Larson did not file a Notice of Appeal and thus
his motions were not timely. Id.
On April 18, 2006, Mr. Larson filed, pro se, a Notice of Appeal. R363-4.
Mr. Larson again requested assistance and the appointment of counsel in a letter
received by the trial court on April 25, 2006. R369. The Utah Supreme Court
transferred the case to the Utah Court of Appeals on May 4, 2006. R370. This
Court temporarily remanded the matter to the Third District Court on May 11,
2006, for the appointment of counsel. R373. The Salt Lake Legal Defenders
Association was appointed to represent Mr. Larson on June 8, 2006 (R379), and
the court entered a Finding of Indigency and Order of Appointment of Counsel on
July 13, 2006. R388-90. Current counsel was subsequently appointed.
This matter previously came before this Court and, pursuant to the
stipulation of the parties, was remanded back to the district court for a hearing
pursuant to State v. Manning, supra. The parties subsequently stipulated that Mr.
Larson's arraignment counsel was ineffective and further stipulated that his right
to appeal should be reinstated. The district court signed an Order reinstating Mr.
2

2005 UT 61, 122P.3d628.
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Larson's right to appeal on October 16, 2007, and Mr. Larson timely filed a Notice
of Appeal on October 23, 2007.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 10, 2003, Mr. Larson was charged with several first degree
felonies for Aggravated Robbery, and one second degree felony count of
Purchase, Transfer, Possession or Use of a Firearm by a Restricted Person. Rl-6.
A Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending Charges dated April 18, 2003,
was delivered to the Warden on May 5, 2003 and filed with the trial court on May
16,2003. R21-3 (Addendum A); R416:55. September 3, 2003, was 120 calendar
days after the filing of the request. R416:98, 101. At the time he was charged,
Mr. Larson was serving a commitment at the Utah State Prison on another case for
which he was released on January 13,2004. R416:102.
A preliminary hearing was schedule for June 10, 2003 (R19-20), at which
time counsel for the State explained that because she had 13-14 witnesses
(R409:l3), both parties stipulated to continue the matter to a special setting. R245. The trial court offered to schedule the hearing in two weeks but the State was
unavailable. R409:2. The hearing was continued to July 3, 2003. Id. The State
did not notify the trial court of Mr. Larson's request for 120-day disposition.

3

R409 contains multiple transcripts from several hearings and thus there are
duplicate page numbers. Accordingly, the page number in the citation refers to
the transcript from the date indicated.
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On July 14, 2003, counsel again stipulated to a continuance of the
preliminary hearing to determine if the federal government would file charges
against Larson for the offenses in this case, in which case the State case was to be
dismissed, and the court scheduled the matter for a status conference on July 28,
2003. R26-7; R409:l. Again, the State made no mention of Mr. Larson's request
for 120-day disposition.
On July 28, 2003, counsel for Mr. Larson indicated that there was still no
word about whether the federal government was going to indict Mr. Larson and
requested a preliminary hearing. R409:l. The court scheduled the hearing for
both August 27 and October 8, 2003 as a ''backup." R409:2-3. Again, the State
said nothing about Mr. Larson's request for 120-day disposition, which would
expire before the October 8 backup date.
At the preliminary hearing scheduled on August 27, 2003, Mr. Larson was
transported from the prison but his counsel made a scheduling error and appeared
late. R30-31, 35-9: R410:6. Fifteen minutes after the hearing was to have started,
the trial court imposed costs against the Salt Lake Legal Defenders for the
witnesses, the court reporter, and transportation costs. R410:5-6. At the State's
request, the court kept the matter scheduled on the backup date of October 8,
2003, and found that because defense counsel had failed to appear, defense
counsel had waived Mr. Larson's right to a speedy trial. R31-3; R410:6-7.4
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Defense counsel, Mr. O'Connell appeared about 30 minutes late. R416:91.
8

In response to the court's finding of waiver, Mr. Larson asked, "How can I
be held to account for another person when I have no power over him?" The court
responded:
It's a good question. Other than to say because you could go to prison for
the rest of your life, I'll just - if you need an attorney, we wouldn't
presume to try to get you to go to court without one. For purposes of this
segment of time I'm not holding failure for you to have a speedy trial
against the State. It doesn't count against them.
R410:7. Again, there was no mention at this time of the fact that Mr. Larson had
filed a request for 120-day disposition almost 120 days previously. In its written
Order of Contempt, the trial court found that Mr. Larson's attorney had "impeded
the administration of justice [and] . . . his client's right to a speedy trial..." (R37;
Addendum B).
The preliminary hearing was conducted and all the charges were bound
over on October 8, 2003, more than 120 days after Mr. Larson filed his request for
120-day disposition. R42-5. Ten witnesses, who were also victims, testified about
the robbery that occurred at the Crown Burger restaurant on April 2, 2002. R411.
None of the witnesses identified Mr. Larson as the perpetrator. R411:10, 16, 27,
29, 40, 42, 44-5, 51, 59, 61-2, 64, 69, 72, 76, 73-4, 79-80. However, the defense
stipulated to the admission of a DNA report allegedly showing that blood found at
the scene was a match for Mr. Larson. R411:84.
The State subsequently filed an amended information adding an additional
first degree felony charge for Aggravated Robbery. R51-5. Mr. Larson pled "not
guilty" to the charges on October 20, 2003, and a jury trial was scheduled for
9

November 18-20, 2003. R48-50. Defense counsel filed a motion and stipulation
for a continuance of the jury trial on November 7, 2003, so the defense could
retain a DNA expert. R56. At a pretrial conference on November 10, 2003, the
minute entry reflects that Mr. Larson waived his right to a speedy trial and the trial
was rescheduled to March 24-6, 2004. R59-61. Counsel for Mr. Larson noted that
the matter had exceeded the 120 days, stating about prior continuances, "most of
them were either agreed to by us or one of them of course was actually my fault"
(R512:4). Accordingly, counsel for Mr. Larson concluded, "I don't think there's
any ground for the 120-day disposition." R512:4. Defense counsel also indicated
his belief that Mr. Larson wanted the benefit of an expert witness testifying for the
defense. R512:5. Mr. Larson agreed he needed an expert witness to testify in his
defense but questioned the status of his motion for 120-day disposition/
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THE COURT:

Mr. Larson, do you understand that, sir?

THE DEFENDANT:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT: You're set to go to trial on the 18th. And Mr. O'Connell is asking
that I continue it, but I will only continue it if you are willing to waive any right
you have to a speedy trial and you agree not to raise any more issues regarding this
120-day disposition.
THE DEFENDANT: How many days is it that we have in favor for my behalf
with the 120 days, do you know?
MR. O'CONNELL: You know, all I can tell you is that almost every continuance
we've had we agreed to it so every time appearing after that doesn't count toward
the 120 days.
THE DEFENDANT: I understand, I'd like to waive my right.
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On February 10, 2004, defense counsel filed a Motion and Stipulation for
Continuance of the jury trial on the ground that the defense's DNA expert needed
more time to evaluate the DNA evidence. R97. The State opposed the motion to
continue. R413:13. A minute entry for a hearing on the motion held on February
20, 2004, indicates that Mr. Larson waived his right to a speedy trial and his
request for 120-day disposition; the jury trial was rescheduled to June 8-10, 2004.
Rl05-07. Mr. Larson waived his right to a speedy trial from that time forward but
did not want to waive any past rights. R413:15. Mr. Larson was caught between
the proverbial rock and a hard place in that he did not want to give up his rights
but did not want to go to trial unprepared. As the following discussion shows, Mr.
Larson was forced by the district court to waive his rights and did not understand
the status of his 120-day disposition:
MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, the State would like the record to be clear
that the defendant waives any detainer issues also, and we'll now be moving
forward to trial.
THE COURT: That's right, he did file a MR. O'CONNELL, JR.: Right, right. And I was about to - he was asking
me to explain that maybe there were some issues in the past with problems, but
anything from this point on, he would waive.
THE DEFENDANT: If my time's exceeded, I would like to press my
rights.
THE COURT: Okay. So you understand you're not going to get a trial date until
sometime after the first of the year?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
R512:5.
11

THE COURT: Well, then, we're not going to continue the trial. Do you
want to have a chat with him about it? Because I'm not going to continue the trial
if he's going to make a problem. You can take him back in the back, if you want
to, Mr. O'Connell
MR. O'CONNELL, JR.: Your Honor we've talked about it. There were
some issues early on about this taking a period [ofjtime; whether or not that was
my fault or not. And - but I've told him that the State says we're - this is facing
from this point on. That may still be an issue from that point on, but he does want
to waive if (sic) for now.
THE COURT: Waive it now? He needs to waive it permanently, because
I'm not going to grant a continuance otherwise. I don't want to have any
problems. And he's raising the issue, and he needs to understand that we're set for
trial. I'm willing to do the trial, but you need to understand that Mr. O'Connell is
telling me that he can't be prepared to defend you because he needs this analysis
done of the DNA testing.
And if you're going to create a problem about it, then it's not going to
happen. We're going to trial.
And if you're willing to waive any rights you have relating to the [120-day]
disposition and speedy trial, then I'm willing to grant a continuance. Otherwise,
no
MR. O'CONNELL, JR.: Thanks, your Honor. I have gone over that, he's
willing to waive at this point his speedy trial rights and we do need to continue it..

THE COURT: You understand, Mr. Larson, what you're doing?
THE DEFENDANT: I feel like I'm being forced in to this.
THE COURT: Well, you are.
THE DEFENDANT: Because by all rights, I should have a speedy trial,
andTHE COURT: Well, okay, we're going to trial. End of story. You're the
one that's pressing it. We have a trial date set already. I'm ready to go.
THE DEFENDANT: That's not what I'm saying.
THE COURT: This is not me. I'm not forcing anything.
12

THE DEFENDANT: That's not what I'm saying.
THE COURT: What are you saying? I don't feel comfortable with this.
THE DEFENDANT: I agree to waive my rights.
THE COURT: I still don't feel comfortable with it. This just isn't going to
happen.
THE DEFENDANT: Can I speak?
THE COURT: Yeah, go ahead.
THE DEFENDANT: I know it's crucial to my case for my lawyer to go
over all the DNA tests and everything. If I don't have that, then I don't have no
chance at winning in my trial, to prove my innocence.
But at the same time, I was charged with this crime and I filed a 120-day
disposition, and it wasn't my fault that the trial got delayed, that the time passed,
and it's been over a year.
And if there's a chance I could have my case dismissed because of that,
then I would like to go with that. But, at the same time, I know I need this DNA.
So, I know I need the DNA more than anything, so I would like to waive my
rights....
THE COURT: And I suppose you feel comfortable with that, but I want to
feel comfortable with you . . .
THE DEFENDANT: Do you review my speedy trial rights after the trial or
before?
THE COURT: No, you're waiving them. That's why.
THE DEFENDANT: I wasn't waiving them. Would you look into that
now or afterwards?
THE COURT: No, I don't look in to it at all, because I'm telling you now,
we're either going to go to trial in March or you give up those rights to a speedy
trial, and it's over. That issue is gone. Do you understand what I'm saying?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. What's unclear in my mind is, I filed a 120-day
disposition -
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THE COURT: Right.
THE DEFENDANT: — and the time has passed; over eight months.
THE COURT: That's true. I would think every time we've addressed the
issue when we've continued the trial dates.
MR. O'CONNELL, JR.: Your Honor, you're right, and people do that all
the time, and people go past the 120 days, and their speedy trial rights, and at least
the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court has anticipated that.... I don't think
we would have much grounds on that. The DNA is the important issue....
THE COURT: . . . You're willing to do it, then, Mr. Larson?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
R413.T5-21.
At a pretrial conference conducted on May 24, 2004, the trial court
informed Mr. Larson that he had already waived his request for 120-day
disposition and Mr. Larson indicated he wanted to fire his counsel. R129-130.6

6

MR. O'CONNELL: . . . [Mr. Larson] has some concerns about my being
comfortable with going to trial and I think specifically on the issue of the 120
disposition.

THE COURT: Well, what does that mean? Somebody better explain that to me.
We've already taken care of that issue . .. You're too late on the 120 days.
THE DEFENDANT: No, see, I don't feel comfortable going to my lawyer being
that he misrepresented me already, you know.
THE COURT: He hasn't misrepresented you, I assure of that.
THE DEFENDANT: Well, I put in a 120-day disposition right when I was
charged, right?
THE COURT: . . . we've addressed that issue every time this has come u p . . . .
And you waived it last time so Mr. O'Connell could do a good job for you and
now you're telling me you want to hire another lawyer and continue this case . . .
14

THE DEFENDANT: Well, I don't - being that he misrepresented me with the - 1
talked to him about it in the beginning THE COURT: Let's get it straight, he has not misrepresented anything. Mr.
O'Connell is a good lawyer. He would do you a good job. If you want to hire
someone, that's fine . . .
THE DEFENDANT: I don't feel comfortable going to trial with him.
THE COURT: Are you going to hire a lawyer?
THE DEFENDANT: I'm going to try, yeah.
THE COURT: What if you can't hire a lawyer?
THE DEFENDANT: Well, then I'm supposed to be appointed a new lawyer.
THE COURT: You're not going to be picking and choosing lawyers. And there
comes a time when we're going to draw the line and you're stuck.... And any
issue relating to the 120-day disposition, as far as I'm concerned, is a waiver. And
if you want to waive again, then I'll consider continuing this. But if you are
unwilling to waive, then forget it, you're going to trial on the 8th.
THE DEFENDANT: Well, I want to fire him, I don't feel comfortable going to
trial with him being that he was aware of this and he did nothing - he wouldn't
even file the motion for me when I asked him to. Told me that I didn't have no
rights. That it didn't matter about it. And this was six, seven months ago
THE COURT: . . . But you just need to understand that the 120-day detainer
disposition is gone. That time is gone. We're far beyond that. You've waived
every time we've talked to you about continuing this trial, so that's not an issue.
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I understand that.
THE COURT: And any attorney you talk to better not bring it up to me because
I'm not going to listen
THE DEFENDANT: . . . the thing is, I know I don't have no grounds on my 120day disposition, but at the beginning of all this I did have rights for that and Mr.
O'Connell, he waived my rights without my consenting.
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THE COURT: That's not true.
THE DEFENDANT: By him not showing up to court and then him notfilingthe
motion, what THE COURT: Well, it was pending, we discussed it every time.
THE DEFENDANT: .. . well, then howr come he told me he wouldn't bring it up?
I wanted to bring it up, he would never do i t . . *frommy understanding, right, I
was supposed to be in trial within 120 days and my time surpassed that by almost
a whole year. And when I talked to my lawyer about it, he said that it didn't
matter. That we'll worry about it later. He said that I don't have no grounds.
Well, I talked to another lawyer and he told me that wasn't true.
THE COURT: Well, that's too bad, he's giving you bad advice. The 120 days is
history.
THE DEFENDANT: . . . he didn't represent me in the first place [] by bringing it
up and filing the motion . . .
THE COURT: He did bring it u p . . . . We had your trial set THE DEFENDANT: Then how come my case wasn't dropped?
THE COURT: We had your trial set within that time.
THE DEFENDANT: No, it wasn't.
THE COURT: Listen to me, we did, and Mr. O'Connell wanted to be able to
prepare appropriately for it and so it was continued.
THE DEFENDANT: . . . no, my time . . . had surpassed (sic) when that happened.
. . . It had already passed eight months.
THE COURT: I have not reviewed the file, but I don't know.... So, I'm not
going to discuss this 120 days anymore... . And I'm telling you right now any
new lawyer that comes in that wants to talk about it, I'm not going to listen to
them.... It's over. We need to just get this case set for trial and get it tried.
Okay? Now, be realistic, but don't beridiculous,how much time to you think you
need to hire a lawyer?
THE DEFENDANT: Two months.
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On June 28, 2004, the matter was referred back to Salt Lake Legal Defenders for
the appointment of new counsel. R135-36.
On July 14, 2004, James Valdez entered an appearance as counsel for Mr.
Larson and the matter was set for a hearing on Mr. Larson's motion for 120-day
disposition (R161-2, 230-36; Addendum C ) on August 4, 2004. R147-50. At
the hearing, Mr. Larson testified he discussed his 120-day disposition with Mr.
O'Connell on October 8, 2003, the date of the preliminary hearing, at which time
he asked Mr. O'Connell to file a motion to dismiss. R416:15-6. Mr. O'Connell

THE COURT: If I give you two months . . . this case won't get set until October
or November.
THE DEFENDANT: I'm aware of that.... This is my life, right? . . . And, you
know, being that I don't trust him, that he messed up part of my case already, I
won't go to trial with h i m . . . .
MS. FIELDS: Your Honor,... would the record put that the defendant is waiving
any right with regard to the 120-day detainer by the fact that he is requesting a
continuance.
THE COURT: He already h a s . . . .
THE DEFENDANT: Look, the only reason I did that is because [Mr. O'Connell]
advised me to.
THE COURT: And he gave you good advice . . . you can't take it back n o w . . . .
Okay, it's on the record. We have it on the record. She's written it down.
THE DEFENDANT: Why couldn't my case have been dropped if my time is
surpassed (sic)? . . . I didn't want to waive i t . . . [the waiver] was only because
[Mr. O'Connell] told that that didn't matter nothing.
R414;3-ll.
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advised Mr. Larson that there were no grounds to file such a motion. R416:16, 712.7 On October 20, 20039 when Mr. Larson again asked Mr. O'Connell to file a
motion to dismiss, Mr. O'Connell "said that he wouldn't file a frivolous motion."
R416.-17.
Mr. Larson further testified that he believed Mr. O'Connell and relied upon
his advice. R416:18, Mr. Larson asked Mr. O'Connell on numerous occasions to
file a motion to dismiss based on the fact that over 120 days had passed since he
filed his request for disposition, but Mr. O'Connell repeatedly declined, telling
Mr. Larson he "had no rights on it" and the best thing was to agree to a
continuance. R416:20, 25-6. Mr. O'Connell told Mr. Larson he should waive his
rights under the 120-day disposition because Mr. O'Connell was not prepared for
trial and if Mr. Larson did not waive, he would go to trial unprepared particularly
regarding the DNA evidence. R416:26. Mr. Larson relied on Mr. O'Connell's
advice and initially did not speak directly to the trial court about the 120-day
disposition because that was his attorney's role. R416:20, 27, 39, 53, 55. Mr.
Larson also did not know that firing his court-appointed attorney was an option,
and only did so when advised by another attorney that a motion to dismiss would
be meritorious. R416:40, 54.
Mr. O'Connell testified that at the time of the preliminary hearing in
October 2003 when 120 days had already passed, his primary concern was to
7

Mr. O'Connell testified that while he did not believe there were any grounds to
file a motion to dismiss pursuant to the 120-day disposition, he "didn't rule it out
at that point either." R416:72.
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retain a DNA expert to evaluate the evidence because none of the eyewitnesses
were able to identify the perpetrator. R416:73. Therefore, the outcome of the case
hinged upon that evidence. R416:73-5. At that point in October 2003, defense
counsel did not even have any reports from the crime lab. R416:74.
When Mr. O'Connell requested those reports from the prosecutor, he was
told he had to subpoena the crime lab. R416:76-7. When he did so, the crime lab
responded with a letter stating "it was going to take them sometime to get the
information together to give it to [the defense]." R416:76-7. Accordingly, Mr.
O'Connell had to ask the court for another continuance of the trial on November
10, 2003, so he could obtain the needed information from the state crime lab and
then give it to his expert for review. R416:76-7.
On February 20, 2004, Mr. O'Connell asked for another continuance
because his DNA expert had been retained on three cases, including Mr. Larson's,
two of which had to be tried first and thus took precedence over Mr. Larson's
case. R416:80. Mr. Larson was willing to agree to the continuance because he
recognized the importance of the DNA evidence although he had concerns about
the 120-day disposition. R416:80. Mr. O'Connell testified, "At that point
basically we sort of had a choice, we could either pursue the 120-day disposition
and go forward on trial in March [2004] and deal with that issue or we could
continue the case basically and stop pursuing the 120-day disposition and give me
a chance to do the DNA." R416:81. Mr, Larson was "worried about losing his
120-day disposition motion" but was persuaded by his attorney that he "needed the
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continuances more than [] 120-day disposition issues." R416:95-6, When Mr.
Larson fired Mr. O'Connell in May 2004, Mr. O'Connell was prepared to proceed
with the trial. R416:83.
In February 2004, Mr. O'Connell believed Mr. Larson had a "really good
appeal issue" with regard to his request for 120-day disposition because the trial
court had put the defense in the impossible position of proceeding to trial
unprepared if they did pursue a motion to dismiss. R416:84-5, 87. Mr. Larson
was forced to choose either to pursue a motion to dismiss and go to trial
unprepared or waive his speedy trial rights pursuant to his request for 120-day
disposition. R416:87. Mr. O'ConnelPs recollection was that he did not become
aware of Mr. Larson's request for 120-day disposition until the State mentioned it.
R416:89. However, he had no recollection of any discussions between the State
and the defense about the pending disposition. R416:92. Mr. O'Connell testified
that he could not have been prepared to go to trial on this case within 120 days.
R416:94-5.
The trial court denied Mr. Larson's motion to dismiss on August 13, 2004.
R224-6. The trial court specifically found that the request for 120-day disposition
was delivered to the Warden on May 5, 2003 and would have expired on
September 2, 2003. R238 (Addendum D), 417:3. However, the court found that
the time was "tolled" from June 10 - July 14, 2003 on the ground that there was
good cause to continue the preliminary hearing to a special setting and the delay
was "therefore, attributable to the Defendant." R240, 417:4. The court also found
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that the time was "tolled" on July 14 and again on July 28, 2003 because the
parties were waiting to see if federal charges would be filed against Mr. Larson.
R417:4. Therefore, the delay was again "attributable to the Defendant."
The time was again "tolled" on August 27 - October 8, 2003 causing a
delay "attributable to the Defendant", because Mr. Larson's counsel appeared late
for the August preliminary hearing. R240, 417:4-5. Finally, the trial court found
that the time was also "tolled" from November 10, 2003 until the time of his
August 13, 2004 Ruling based on defense counsel's requests to continue the trial.
R417:5-6. The trial court found that "the law supports a conclusion that there was
good cause for the continuances and it should not be attributable to the
prosecutor." R417:6. Accordingly, the trial court found that only 71 days of the
120 had expired. R241, 417:11.
Mr. Larson's counsel then made a motion to continue the trial to allow him
time to prepare for DNA evidence, to which the State objected. R228-9; R417:7.
When Mr. Larson agreed that his counsel should have time to prepare himself for
trial, the trial court granted the defense's motion. R417:7-8.
Over the State's objection, Mr. Larson laterfiredMr. Valdez and the
scheduled trial date was stricken as a result. R257-8, 276-91; R419:3-5. Mr.
Larson requested additional time on December 13, 2004, for his family to retain
private counsel. R292-3. Then on January 3, 2004, Mr. Larson filed his pro se
Motion to Appeal Judge Barratt's Decision of Ruling on the Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss, Pursuant to 120 Day Disposition Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1, wherein
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he sought 'to have the above formentioned (sic) case appealed in the Utah
Supreme Court, State of Utah . . , " R302-10, Exhibit E. The trial court denied
this motion on the ground that "no appeal could be addressed until there was a
trial." R321.
Mr. Larson subsequently retained attorney D. Christopher VanCampen in
January 2005 and waived his right to a speedy trial on January 24, 2005. R324,
328-9. On February 14, 2005, and with Mr. VanCampen's assistance, Mr. Larson
pleaded guilty to three counts of Aggravated Robbery with a weapons
enhancement, pursuant to State v. Sery, supra, so he could "pursu[e] his rights to
appeal." R340 (Addendum F); R420:3-4.
Mr. Larson was sentenced to prison for three consecutive six-years-to-life
commitments on April 4, 2005. R345-6;R421;9. Additional facts will be cited
herein as warranted.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Larson's motion to
dismiss pursuant to the speedy trial statute (now repealed). The court did not
address the State's burden of compliance notwithstanding the facts demonstrating
that the State failed to meet that burden. Further, the district court'sfindingsand
conclusions that delays were attributable to Mr. Larson and supported by good
cause are clearly erroneous and incorrect.

22

Mr. Larson was also denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel when his trial counsel failed to appear at the preliminary hearing and
failed to file a motion to dismiss pursuant to the speedy trial statute.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
MR. LARSON'S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO THE
SPEEDY TRIAL STATUTE,
The determination of whether a trial court abused its discretion in denying a

motion to dismiss pursuant to the speedy trial statute involves a two-step inquiry.
First, an appellate court must determine when the disposition period commenced
and when it expired. Second, the appellate court "must then determine whether
good cause excused the delay." State v. Wagenman, 71 P.3d at 186 (citations and
quotations omitted). Good cause may be found if a delay was caused by the
defendant such as in asking for a continuance or by "unforeseen problems arising
immediately prior to trial." Id. at 187 (citations omitted).
Mr. Larson's Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending Charges was
delivered to the Warden on May 5, 2003, and filed with the trial court on May 16,
2003. R21 -3; R416:5 5. From the record, it is apparent that the first time Mr.
Larson's request for disposition was even discussed was at a pretrial conference on
November 20, 2003, long after the initial 120 days had expired. R512:4. The
prosecution never raised the issue prior to expiration of the 120 days. See,
R409:l-2 (June 10, 2003 transcript); R409:l (July 14, 2003 transcript); R409:l-3
(July 28, 2003 transcript); R31-3 and R410:6-7 (although the trial court found Mr.
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Larson waived his right to a speedy trial because his counsel failed to appear on
time, the State did not bring Mr. Larson's request for disposition to the trial court's
attention at that time, nor was it discussed). Thus, the record demonstrates that
Mr. Larson's request for disposition was not addressed with the district court until
after 120 days had already expired.
In its August 13, 2004 ruling denying Mr. Larson's motion to dismiss under
the speedy trial statute, the district court found there was good cause to delay the
matter and determined that all delays were attributable to Mr. Larson. R417. The
court further concluded that only 71 of the 120 days had elapsed since the notice
was delivered to the Warden on May 5, 2003. R241; R417:l 1.
Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1(3) (repealed) imposed upon the prosecutor the
affirmative obligation to ensure that good cause for any delay is "shown in open
court." The statute also provided that the disposition period commenced upon the
date the notice is delivered to the Warden. Subsection (4) required the prosecutor
"to have the matter heard within the time required" and directed that the district
court "shall order the matter dismissed with prejudice" if the prosecutor's failure
to have the matter heard within the 120 days "is not supported by good cause[.]"
This language "clearly places the burden of complying with the statute on
the prosecutor." State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911,915 (Utah 1998) (concluding that
although Heaton's motion to dismiss was properly denied, the trial "court clearly
erred in concluding that Heaton was in the same position as the State and therefore
shared some of the responsibility to find out why his case had not been set for
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trial"). The prosecutor "may not passively accept a defendant's delay of [a
hearing], and then turn around and claim the delay kept the prosecution from
meeting its burden." State v. Wagenman, 71 P.3d at 187 (remanding the matter
back to the district court with instructions to dismiss with prejudice because "the
State had failed to request that the trial court make its good cause determination in
open court pursuant to section 77-29-1(3)" (as cited in State v. Pedockie, 95 P.3d
1182, 1188 (Utah App. 2004)).
When a prisoner causes a delay of the trial, "he indicates his willingness to
temporarily waive his right to a speedy trial." State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916.
However, there must be "sufficient evidence to support a finding that, but for the
defendant's actions, the trial would have been brought within the required
disposition period." State v. Hankerson, 122 P.3d 561, 565 (Utah 2005). The
district court made no such finding in this case.
The State's sole burden of compliance cannot be met simply by a showing
that a delay was not caused by the prosecutor. State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916
("to hold that good cause is supported by the lone fact that the delay was not
caused by the prosecutor would contradict the language in section 77-29-1(4)
which places the burden of complying with the statute on the prosecution")
(citations omitted). Implicit in the prosecutor's "affirmative duty" to have the
matter heard within the statutory period is "the duty to notify the court that a
detainer notice has been filed and to make a good faith effort to comply with the
statute." Id.
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A,

The State failed to meet its burden of compliance.

During the first 120 days after Mr. Larson filed his notice for disposition,
the matter was delayed because the State sought a stipulation to continue the
preliminary hearing and then passively waited for the federal government to bring
charges against Mr. Larson. R24-5; R26-9, By the August 27, 2003 preliminary
hearing when Mr. Larson's counsel appeared late resulting in another continuance,
expiration of the 120 days was only one week away. R30-31, 35-9. During the
initial 120 days, the prosecutor never brought Mr. Larson's notice of disposition to
the district court's attention and the court never made a determination in open
court that any of those delays were supported by good cause. Thus, the plain
language of the statute was not complied with.
Several months later, the district court determined only in hindsight that all
delays were for good cause and attributable to Mr. Larson either because he
stipulated to the continuances or because his counsel appeared late, which
circumstance was beyond Mr. Larson's control, as noted on the record. R410:7.
Addendum D. The district court did not acknowledge the State's burden of
compliance in its ruling or the fact that the State consistently disregarded Mr.
Larson's request for disposition and made no effort to bring this matter to trial
within 120 days. The State did not even provided the critical DNA evidence to the
defense until long after the 120 days had expired.
As demonstrated in record cited above, the State did not notify the district
court that a detainer notice had been filed or make any good faith effort to comply
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with the statute. The State also failed to request the trial court to make any
determination of good cause for delay in open court as required under Utah Code
Ann. §77-29-1(3) until long after the 120 days had expired.
The trial court's analysis and its conclusions are incorrect as a matter of law
because it failed to address the Staters statutorily imposed obligation to make a
good faith effort to bring this matter to trial within 120 days. Thus, while Mr.
Larson has the burden at this juncture of demonstrating that the trial court's factual
findings in this context are clearly erroneous, the trial court made no factual
findings relative to whether the State met its burden of compliance. It simply
disregarded that burden. Accordingly, the district court's analysis and conclusions
are inherently flawed and there are no factual findings for Mr. Larson to contest.
Nonetheless, there is no evidence on the record to support afindingthat the
State even recognized or tried to comply with its obligations imposed under Utah
Code Ann. §77-29-1, particularly within the first 120 days after Mr. Larson filed
his notice. The State failed to meet its burden of compliance.
B.

The evidence does not support a finding of good cause for delay.

It is apparent from the record that although defense counsel stipulated to a
continuance of the preliminary hearing scheduled on June 10, 2003, that
stipulation was requested by the prosecutor and given to accommodate the
prosecutor because the State had 13-14 witnesses. R409:l. When the court tried to
reschedule that hearing for 2 weeks later, it was the prosecutor who was
unavailable. R409:2. On July 14, 2003, both counsel stipulated to another
27

continuance because the State anticipated the federal government would indict Mr.
Larson. R26-7; R409:l. Then on July 28, 2003, defense counsel requested a
preliminary hearing, which the court then scheduled for August 27, 2003 and
October 8, 2003 as a "back-up" date. August 27, 2003 was one week prior to the
expiration of the 120 days and October 8, 2003 was more than a month beyond it.
Notwithstanding these facts demonstrating that the State made no effort to
bring this matter to trial within 120 days, the State's actions prevented that from
occurring in any event. The State failed to provide the crime lab report and critical
DNA evidence to the defense until long after the initial 120 days had expired. The
district court ignored this dispositive fact in its ruling. There is no evidence that
the State's failure to timely provide this critical evidence to the defense was
supported by good cause. Thus the district court's finding of good cause is clearly
erroneous and Mr. Larson's motion to dismiss should have been granted.
At the time of the October 8, 2003 preliminary hearing, which was well
beyond the initial 120 days, the State had not even provided a copy of the crime
lab report to the defense. R416:74. The State obviously had this evidence at the
time of the preliminary hearing since the report was admitted then. R411:84. This
evidence was critical because none of the eyewitnesses could identify Mr. Larson.
R411:84; R416:73. The outcome of trial hinged upon the DNA evidence and the
defense could not prepare adequately for trial without it. R416:73-5.
When defense counsel requested the DNA evidence from the prosecutor
after the initial 120 days, the prosecutor not only would not provide it but told
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defense counsel he had to obtain that evidence by subpoenaing the crime lab.
R416:76-7. When defense counsel did so, the state crime lab responded with a
letter delaying the matter even farther, stating "it was going to take them sometime
to get the information together" (R416:76-7). Because this information had
already been provided to the prosecutor and admitted at the preliminary hearing,
this dilatory conduct on the part of the State was unwarranted and it served only to
unnecessarily delay Mr. Larson's trial even further.
Because of this unnecessary delay attributable to the State, defense counsel
was forced to request another continuance of the trial that was then scheduled on
November 10, 2003, which date was more than two months after the expiration of
the 120 days. Id.
The defense could not proceed to trial without the crime lab report. The
State would not make that report available to them until long after the 120 days
had passed. The district court did not address this dilatory conduct on the part of
the State in its ruling when it found that the delays were attributable only to Mr.
Larson. Moreover, the court's and the State's conduct placed the defense in the
impossible position of proceeding to trial unprepared if they did pursue a motion
to dismiss pursuant to the speedy trial statute. R416:73-7, 81, 84-5, 87, 95-6.
The district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Larson's motion to
dismiss because the State took a both an affirmative and a passive role in allowing
this matter to be unnecessarily delayed. Id; R24-5, 26-9; R409. The first
continuance of the preliminary hearing was sought to accommodate the State.
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R409:2. Further, during the initial 120 days the prosecutor did not notify the
district court about Mr. Larson's pending request for disposition nor take any
measures to ensure that good cause for delay was shown in open court. Mr.
Larson's request was simply ignored. Therefore, the district court's factual
finding that all delays were attributable to Mr. Larson is clearly erroneous.
The first time Mr. Larson's constitutional right to a speedy trial was even
discussed was on August 27, 2003, about one week prior to the expiration of the
initial 120 days. R30-1; 35-9; R410:6. At that time, the trial court concluded,
over Mr. Larson's objection, that Mr. Larson's attorney had waived his right to a
speedy trial when he had not appeared 15 minutes after the hearing was scheduled
to begin. Id. This legal conclusion that an attorney can waive a defendant's right
to a speedy trial over his client's objection is incorrect as a matter of law.
From the outset, because constitutional rights belong exclusively to the
defendant, an attorney cannot waive any such rights, particularly over the
defendant's objection. Further, there is no evidence to suggest that defense
counsel's failure to appear at a preliminary hearing scheduled one week prior to
the expiration of the initial 120-day period caused the trial to be held outside the
120 days. See, State v. Hankerson, 122 P.3d 684 (Utah 2005) (noting that
defendant's motion to dismiss did not cause the trial to be delayed beyond the 120
days).
Finally, after the initial 120 days when Mr. Larson wanted to pursue a
motion to dismiss under the speedy trial statute, the district court repeatedly
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coerced and forced Mr. Larson to waive his right by unjustly placing him in the
impossible position of giving up his speedy trial remedy or going to trial
unprepared. R412:5;R413:15-21;R414:3-11;R416:26, 81, 84-5, 87,95-6. The
United State Supreme Court has described just such judicial action of forcing a
criminal defendant to surrender one constitutional right in favor of another as
"intolerable." Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968); see also, Hunt
v. Mitchell 261 F.3d 575, 584 (6th Cir. 2001) ("While Hunt's statutory right to a
speedy trial under Ohio law may not equate precisely to his constitutional right to
a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment, the element of coerced choice decried
by the Court in Simmons is nevertheless present here. When Hunt refused to
waive his right to a speedy trial, the trial court effectively forced him to go to trial
with an unprepared attorney.").
Based on these facts and the applicable law, the trial court's factual
findings are clearly erroneous and its legal conclusions are incorrect in multiple
instances. First, the State would not provide the critical DNA evidence to the
defense until long after the initial 120 days had expired, thereby making it
impossible for Mr. Larson to proceed to trial. Second, the prosecutor never
informed the trial court of Mr. Larson's request for disposition, nor did it fulfill its
affirmative duty to have the court make a showing of good cause in open court.
Moreover, there is no evidence that the State diligently sought to bring this matter
to trial within the 120 days. To the contrary, the State took both an alternating
affirmative and a passive role in delaying this matter.
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Further, a lawyer's deficient performance cannot waive his client's right to
a speedy trial, particularly when the defendant expressly objects to such waiver.
That right belongs exclusively to the defendant. Lastly, when the trial court
finally addressed Mr. Larson's request for disposition after the 120 days had
already expired, the court repeatedly and expressly admitted to forcing Mr. Larson
to give up his right to a speedy trial or lose his right to a fair one. Thus, Mr.
Larson was improperly forced to give up one important due process right to
preserve another important due process right.
Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Larson's
motion to dismiss.
II.

MR. LARSON WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO COUNSEL AND PREJUDICED BY HIS TRIAL COUNSEL'S
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE.
Mr. Larson's constitutional right to counsel was compromised because his

trial counsel rendered deficient performance that prejudiced him. Mr. O'Connell
rendered deficient performance when he appeared late at the August 27, 2003
preliminary hearing and when he did not file a motion to dismiss pursuant to the
speedy trial statute.
Both federal and State courts recognize a defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984) is the seminal case adopted by Utah courts which established the twopronged test for determining whether the right to counsel is violated: (1) whether
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2)
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whether the defendant was prejudiced by the objectively deficient performance,
i.e., there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors,
the results would have been different. See also, Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362
(2000) (reiterating the reasonable probability standard to establish prejudice).
A defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel during all critical
stages in the proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066,
1069 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 425 U.S. 995, 48 L. Ed. 2d 820, 96 S. Ct. 2209
(1976); United States v. Ellison, 798 F.2d 1102 (7th Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 479
U.S. 1038, 93 L. Ed. 2d 845, 107 S. Ct. 893 (1987); United States v. Garrett, 90
F.3d 210, 212 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Veras, 51 F.3d 1365 (7th Cir.),
cert, denied, 133 L. Ed. 2d 444, 116 S. Ct. 540 (1995); Garcia v. State, 846 So. 2d
I
660, 661 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Browning v. Commonwealth, 452 S.E.2d 360,
362-63 (Va. Ct. App. 1994); Martin v. State, 588 N.E.2d 1291, 1293 (Ind.App. 5
Dist. 1992); Randall v. State, 861 P.2d 314, 316 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993); Beals v.
State, 802 P.2d 2, 4 (Nev. 1990); State v. Harell, 80 Wn. App. 802, 804, 911 P.2d
1034 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996); see also, United States v. White, 212 U.S. App. D.C.
185, 659 F.2d 231, 233 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. Hoyt, 18 F. Supp. 2d
477, 479-480 (D. Pa. 1998).
The district court expressly found that Mr. O'Connell's conduct had
"impeded the administration of justice [ a n d ] . . . his client's right to a speedy
trial." R37; Addendum B. Thus while Mr. Larson disagrees that this counsel's
failure to appear could be imputed to Mr. Larson as a waiver of Mr. Larson's
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rights, that his counsel's performance was objectively deficient and prejudicial to
Mr. Larson is a matter of record. Mr. O'Connell's late appearance on August 27,
2003 resulted in the preliminary hearing being continued and unnecessarily
delayed the matter for several more weeks. Had Mr. O'Connell appeared on time,
the time between the preliminary hearing and the trial date would have
additionally accrued against the State. Over 70 days passed between August 27
and November 10, 2003, when defense counsel requested another continuance so
he could obtain the DNA evidence. Adding that time to the 71 days the trial court
found had already accrued against the State in its August 13 2004 ruling, the trial
court would have to have found that over 140 days had passed, thus requiring
dismissal of the case. R241; R417:l 1. Therefore, Mr. Larson was prejudiced by
his counsel's late appearance.
Further, Mr. O'Connell's refusal to file a motion to dismiss pursuant to the
speedy trial statute was also deficient performance that prejudiced Mr. Larson. In
particular and notwithstanding the trial court's erroneous findings of good cause
for delay discussed above, Mr. O'Connell knew that the DNA evidence was
critical in this case and that the State would not provide it to him until long after
the initial 120 days had expired. This delay was attributable solely to the State, as
Mr. O'Connell was aware. R416:76-7. Had Mr. O'Connell raised this dispositive
fact with the trial court in a proper motion to dismiss, such motion should have
been granted, thereby resulting in a different outcome. Therefore, Mr, Larson was
prejudiced by his counsel's failure and refusal to file that motion.
34

CONCLUSION
Mr. Larson respectfully requests this Court to find (1) that the district court
abused its discretion in denying his motion to dismiss pursuant to the speedy trial
statute; and (2) that Mr. Larson's trial counsel rendered deficient performance that
prejudiced Mr. Larson.
Respectfully submitted this 7th day of January, 2008.

..
-^ if
Jennifer K. Gowan<r
Attorney for Mr. Larson

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 7th day of January, 2008,1 caused to be handdelivered a 2 true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to the
following:
Joanne C. Slotnik
Utah Attorney General's Office
Appeals Division
160 East 300 South
6th Floor
PO Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
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DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION,?

NOTICE AND REQUEST. FOR DISPOSITION OF PENDING CHARGE(S)

TO:

DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF INSTITUTIONAL OPERATIONS

40r- C "*

'"

Notice is hereby given that I, Sf\d/]J/J (i. Ljf$0/)
(Inmate Name) do hereby request final disposition. Char^^jf^c-of^ ot
h(]Q. R$. * hziM.hwi*m. £u£af. Persm
gfea^ n |j,

f

pending against. ,me in -th'e . 1M$@B MMt (Mrf *df fttffa^ NJffifecfc, "«
brought by §Sf'UH
fart
*' fit ffiitTii
(piS^tfng
agency e.g., county, city, Attorney General, etc. in the StaTle of
Utah) and request i s hereby made that you forward this notice to
the appropriate authorities together with such information as
required by law.

Dated this jf)

day of

npfll, 2$3

(Month / Year)

Inmate's Name SilMJ/l LtfSd/l

USP#

*****************************************************************

I hereby certify that I have received a copy of the foregoing
notice this 1> day of AVh i^ H'3> (Month / Year) .

Authorized Agent, DIO Record Unit
USP, PO Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020
CUCF, PO Box 898, Gunnison, Utah 84634

(Revised 10/2000)

(TMF 05/05.06,C)

. V • ** # / ^

JT

^ ^: W ^

C;S>"

;ate of Utah
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
DIVISION OF INSTITUTIONAL OPERATIONS
Michael O. Leavitt
Governor
Mike Chabries
Executive Director
Scott V.Carver
Division Director

P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT 84020
(801)576-7000

8 May 2003

Salt Lake County Prosecuting Attorney
231 East 400 South
SLC,UT 84111
RE:

Larson, Shawn
U.S.P.# 25181/88278
DOB: 01/02/78
YOUR CASE UNKNOWN

Dear Sirs:
MR/MRS/MS Shawp Larson is currently incarcerated in the Utah State Prison. He/She is
requesting disposition of untried charges of Agg Robbery, pending in your jurisdiction.
Enclosed is the appropriate paperwork to process his request.
Thank you for your assistance with this matter.
Sincerely,
Mr. Scott Carver, Director
of Institutional Operations

By: Sgt/MarjHBrockbrader
Records/ID Officer
End. (2)
cc: Third District Court Clerk
inmate file

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

CERTIFICATE OF INMATE STATUS
120-DAY DISPOSITION
TO:

RE:

Third District Court Clerk

Larson, Shawn
Inmate Name

25181/88278
USP#

TERM of COMMITMENT: Agg Robbery 1-15
TIME SERVED:
TIME REMAINING:

**time calculated

Approx 06 year(s) 11 mo
Approx. 08 year(s) 01 mo

may not Include

toll

time/credit,

time

seirred

PAROLE ELIGIBILITY: scheduled for parole 00/00/00
Returned on parole violation 05-07-03;-Ncw commit 09-QO^OO
BOARD OF PARDONS DECISION: Hearing set for 00/000000
Possibly expiration: 11-29-2010
Mr. Scott Carver, Director
Institutional Operations
Authorized Agent, DIO Record Unit
Utah State Prison
P. O. Box 250, Draper, UT
84020
cc: file
meb

TabB

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

ORDER OF CONTEMPT

:

CASE NO.

031902498

:

SHAWN DAVID LARSON,

:

Defendant.

:

This matter was given a special setting for a preliminary
hearing before the Court on August 27, 2003, at 9:00 a.m.

It was

originally a second place setting behind a felony trial and Notice
was given on July 28, 2003.

Present at the scheduling conference

were Sharon Fields, prosecutor for the State, and John O'Connell,
Jr., the defendant's attorney.

The defendant was also present,

having been transported from the Utah State Prison.
Present

at

the

hearing

were

twelve

citizen

witnesses

subpoenaed by the State of Utah; the State!s attorney, Sharon
Fields; the defendant, who had again been transported from the
State Prison; and court personnel, including a court reporter.
Pursuant to Section 78-32-2, Utah Code Ann., the Court enters
the following findings of fact:
1.

Mr. O'Connell

was present with his client when this

matter was originally set.

-Zrf-?

PAGE 2

STATE V. LARSON
2.

ORDER OF CONTEMPT

All other persons necessary for the hearing to proceed

were present on the day of the hearing.
3.

The defendant had been transported from the Utah State

Prison for the hearing.
4.

A court reporter was present because the matter involved

eleven first degree felony counts.
5.

Twelve citizens, alleged victims of aggravated assault,

were present.

Each had taken time off work or school or other

duties and had adjusted their schedules to be present at the
hearing.
6.

The State's prosecutor had spoken to Mr. O'Connell two

days prior to the hearing regarding the possibility of stipulating
to portions of the witnesses' proposed testimony.
7.

The court clerk called Mr. O'Connell's office on the

morning of the hearing, and was informed Mr. O'Connell did not have
the matter set on his calendar.
8.

Mr. O'Connell did not appear at the hearing and the Court

dismissed the witnesses and continued the hearing.
9.
and

Mr. O'Connell appeared approximately one-haIf hour later

stated

he

did

not

know

why he didn't

have

the matter

calendared.
10.

After waiting nearly 20 minutes for Mr. O'Connell to

appear and his failing to do so, the Court terminated the hearing.

-zip

ORDER OF CONTEMPT
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STATE V. LARSON

THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS, the Legal Defenders Association to
pay the cost of the 12 witnesses present in the courtroom, at the
rate of $18.50 per witness, transportation costs for the defendant
in the

amount

of

reporter, $60.00.

$48.00,

and

for

the presence

of

the

court

These amounts are due within thirty (30) days of

the date of the Court's Order.
In addition, the Court finds Mr. John O'Connell, Jr., in
contempt of Court for neglect of his duties as an officer of the
court.

Based upon his failure to appear, Mr. O'Connell has impeded

the administration of justice, he has impinged upon his client's
right to a speedy trial, has caused unnecessary and disruptive
burden of judicial resources, and has caused severe inconvenience
to the citizens who appeared in court for the scheduled hearing.
Mr. O'Connell is hereby found in contempt for so doing and fined in
the amount of $300.00, which amount is due within thirty (30) days
of the date of this Order.
Mr. O'Connell's actions have disrupted the 12 citizens of this
state who had to leave work, school and other matters, and has
inconvenienced them in their activities.

The conduct reflects

adversely upon the administration of justice in this District/and

STATE V. LARSON

PAGE 4

ORDER OF CONTEMPT

are all attributed to Mr. O'Connell's failure to appear at this
special setting hearing.
Dated this

3

day of Septemb

^~^Xy
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ORDER OF CONTEMPT

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order of Contempt, to the following, this

day of

September, 2 003:

Sharon Fields
Deputy District Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
John O'Connell, Jr.
Attorney for Defendant
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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JAMES A. VALDEZ (#3308)
tH'R- n 1 "' V '
c
Attomey for SHAWN DAVE) LARSON „ n oQ ?W:
^
466 South400 East Suite 102
W*J J" "
„,.„jH
EC! u
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
<;MT uk* ° "
Telephone: (801) 328-3999
"
.
Facsimile: (801)328-3998
-:^To^
e.,_.
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
MOTION
TO DISMISS PURSUANT
TO DEFENDANTS DEMAND
FOR DISPOSITION PURSUANT
Utah Code Ann. 77-29-5

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SHAWN DAVID LARSON
Defendant.

:
:

Case No. 031902498 FS
JUDGE: WILLIAM BARRETT

The.defendant, SHAWN BAVTD.LARSON, through.his. attorney .of record,
JAMES A. VALDEZ, hereby submits his motion to dismiss and in so doing incorporates
by reference his previous filed pro se documents, entitled Motion for Speedy Trial or
Disposition of Warrant(s), .Complaint(s) .or Indictments.) signed .on May ,6,, 2QQ3 and
acknowledged as filed by the Third District Court, in and for the State of Utah, Salt Lake
Division, on May 16,2003.
D-efendant.now.moves.the.cQurt.tO-dismiss. Ithas.heen.approximately one year
and ten weeks since the filing of the request for disposition and defendant has not had a
trial.
Defendant is awaiting transcripts of all proceedings in order to calculate the
amount of time, number of waivers, number of questionable waivers and time that may

\l o\

have tolled. Upon receipt of those transcripts defendant will file a memorandum of
points and authorities.
Datedihis / L / y d a y .ofiuly, 2Q04.

[LDEZ
N
for SHAWN DAVTO LARSON
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake County District
Attorney 2001 South State Street, S3700, Salt Lake City Utah 84190 on the
JHP

day of.

2004.

\

//-£f
JAMES A. VALDEZ (#3308)
Attorney for Defendant
466 South 400 East, Suite 102
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-3999
Facsimile: (801) 328-3998
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE AND OTHER DEPARTMENTS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

RESPONSE TO STATE'S
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS

Plaintiff.
:
v.
SHAWN DAVID LARSON

:

Defendant.

:

Case No. 031902498 FS
Honorable William W. Barrett

Notice was given that SHAWN DAVID LARSON requested final disposition of any
charges(s) now pending against him in any court in the State of Utah.
The State in their memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss concedes
that notice of defendant's request for 120 day disposition was filed on May 3,2003. Further that
defendant was in fact serving time on a commitment for a parole violation in the Utah State Prison.
Defendant's first court appearance was on April 23,2003 wherein his case was scheduled
for Roll Call on May 1,2003, thereafter scheduled for Preliminary Hearing on May 16,2003 before
Judge Quinn, wherein it was acknowledged on the court docket that a request for disposition had
been filed. (See Court Docket page 5)
The next hearing was scheduled as a preliminary hearing before Judge Maughan for June
1

10,2003. That would be 38 days from the date of filing of the Notice of Request for disposition
without counting the day offiling,,May 3,2003.
June 10,2003 the Preliminary Hearing was reset for July 3,2003,
"Based on the calender being so full today, counsel request this preliminary
hearing be set over as a special setting, as the state has 11 victims that
need to testify. Special Set in is scheduled and counsel stipulate to date."
(Docket p. 5, State attachment B).
See the transcript of the proceedings page 1:
MR. O'CONNELL: Could we call Shawn Larson?
MS. FIELDS; Sharon Fields for the State.
THE COURT: What's happening on this one?
MR. O'CONNELL: Your Honor, this was set today but there's lots of witnesses in this case MS. FIELDS: I have eleven victims, Your Honor.
MR. O'CONNELL: And we talked about this on Monday and figured that with eleven witnesses plus
the discussion this morning (inaudible), we're going to ask for a special setting (inaudible).
THE COURT: How much time do you need to be ready?
MS. FIELDS: Your Honor, I have eleven victims plus totally, plus at least three law enforcement
officers, so 13 or 14 witnesses. We'll probably nee a couple - to three hours in the afternoon,
something like that.
THE COURT: Do you want a Tuesday or a Thursday. This is Tuesday. Do you waniTanother
(inaudible)?
MR. O'CONNELL: Either one will be fine. I mean Pll make arrangements.
THE COURT: And do you want morning or afternoon?
MR. O'CONNELL: Whichever one, Your Honor.
THE COURT: We could do two weeksfromtoday, June 24th.
2
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MS. FIELDS: I can't do that, Your Honor, I'll be gone.
THE COURT: I'm trying to help but I don't know if I'm...
MS. FIELDS: The week of the 24th I have a trial four days.
THE COURT: I could do it July 3rd, that's a Thursday.
MS. FIELDS: That would be fine.
THE COURT: July 3rd.
MR. O'CONNELL: July 3rd works.
THE COURT: Do you want it in the afternoon again?
MR. O'CONNELL: That's fine.
(June 10,2003, transcript, p.l - 2)
Nowhere in the hearing transcript of June 10,2003, is there a waiver from SHAWN
DAVID LARSON, nor is there anyfindingthat there is "good cause" to continue the matter by the
court. Note also that there is no is mention by the prosecution of the pending request for
disposition. More importantly it is a continuance which is more at the convenience of
the prosecution because of the numerous witnesses and the court rather than the defendant.
The time period between June 10,2003 and July 3,2003 is 24 days.
July 2,2003 docket entry page 5:
"07-02-03 PRELIMINARY HEARING Cancelled.
Reason: Stipulation of Counsel"
No indication of a waiver by defendant, no transcript of defendant acknowledging or
consenting to the continuance. A status hearing was scheduled for July 14,2003, therein continued
to see of federal charges would be filed. The status conference is set for July 28,2003. Thereafter
3
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the case was reset to see if Federal charges would be filed. Although the continuance is agreed and
even requested by defense counsel, Mr. O'Connell, no colloquy is held with the defendant, the
defendant does not waive on the record nor does the court make a finding of" good cause" for the
delay. The matter seemed to be reset for October 8,2003. The transcript is confusing as to the date
of the preliminary hearing date. (See July 28,2003, transcript pages 1-3).
One might speculate that both the defense and the prosecution had expectations that
everything including the disposition issue would simply go away if the case was picked up by the
Federal Government. The case would simply be dismissed in the State Court. That of course did not
occur.
A preliminary hearing was scheduled for August 27th, 2003, Defense counsel was not present
and the hearing was rescheduled for October 8,2003. Once again no colloquy with the defendant
for the purpose of acquiring a waiver of the disposition issue .
The preliminary hearing was held and defendant was bound over arraigned on October 8,
2003 then rescheduled and a pretrial conference was scheduled for October 20, 2003. (See Court
Docket at page 10)
At the October 20,2003 pretrial conference before Judge Barrett, mention was made of the
120 day disposition for the first time since the matter was brought up before judge Quinn at the May
16,2003 hearing.
No discussion was conducted with defendant, waiver sought on the record nor finding of
"good cause" for the delay mentioned. To this point it has been 170 days since defendant filed his
request for disposition. The trial is set for November 19,20, and 21,2003. (See October 20,2003
transcript, page 1 -3).
4
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On November 11,2003 the jury trial is reset for March 25, 2004. For the first time there
is a mention in the Court Docket on page 11 that the "defendant waives hisrightto a speedy trial and
the trial is continued ". It has now been 191 days since the defendant has filed his request for a
speedy disposition of the case.
ARGUMENT
The Utah Supreme Court recognizes that section 77-29-1 places the burden of compliance
on the prosecutor. State v. Petersen, 810 P. 2d 421,426 (Utah 1991), State v. Viles, 702 P.2d 1175
(Utah 1985).

As the Court explained, "the prosecutor has an affirmative duty to have the

defendant's matter heard within the statutory period. Implicit in this duty is the duty to notify the
court that a detainer notice has been filed and to make a good faith effort to comply with the statute."
State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911,915 (Utah 1998). The Utah Appellate Court has also acknowledged
that it is the prosecutor's duty to ensure that the defendant is brought to trial within 120 days after
filing a notice. State v. Lindsay, 2000 Ut App 379, State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App. 281 and more
recently, State v. Pedockie, 2004 Ut App 224 at If 22.
Where a defendant is not brought to trial within the proscribed time, "good cause may
support the prosecutor's failure to comply." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915-16. Good cause is not shown
where "the prosecutor's failure is inaction," Id. At 916, such as "doing nothing whatsoever to bring
[the defendant's] case to trial within the statutory period." Id. Neither is it shown simply by the fact
that "the delay was not caused by the prosecutor." Peterson, 810 P.2d at 426.
Ultimately, the trial court may find good cause based upon its underlying findings of fact
with regard to the reason for the delay. Heaton, at 916-17, See Pedokie at f25-27. Some facts that
have formed a reasonable basis for finding of "good cause" for delay include conflicts of interest
5

with the defense counsel where the delay was not prolonged, Peterson, 810 P.2d at 426-27; the
defendant's request for a preliminary hearing after a hearing had already been waived, Heaton, at
916, illness of the defense counsel; State v. Bullock, 699 R2d 753, 756 (Utah 1985), and the
defendant's change of defense counsel along with several requests for continuances and an agreement
to postpone the trial. State v. Phathammavon, 860 P.2d 1001,1004 (Utah Ct. App.1993); State v.
Maestas, 815 P.2d 1319,1321 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). See also State v. Pedokie, 2004 UT App. 224,
at f 26 quoting State v. Huston, 2003 UT App 416, % 11, 82 P.3d 219, ". . .relatively short delay
caused by unforseen problems arising immediately prior to trial"
CONCLUSION
The period of delays should not be attributable to Mr. Larson. Mr. Larson was not advised
on the record, nor did he ever waive on the record until the hearing on November 10th, 2003.
There is no record as to the reason only a docket entry that the defendant waived his right to a speedy
trial. The prosecutor who had a duty to inform the trial court of the need for urgency due to the
notice and demand for 120 - day disposition, did not so inform the court. See Heaton Id.at 915, In
these circumstances the trial court should notfindthat the periods of delays are attributable to Mr.
Larson.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _ L day of

^T^S^

/aldez

,2004.

7

:orney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Response to State's Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion to Suppress was delivered to Sharon Fields
Deputy District Attorney and Katherine Peters, Deputy District
Attorney, in person or to 111 East Broadway Suite 400, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84111 on the

*

day of

/^~^p

2004
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DAV1D E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
SHARON FIELDS, Bar No. 7518
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

SHAWN DAVID LARSON,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, AND COURT ORDER

Petitioner,
Case No. 031902498 FS
-vs~

Honorable William W. Barrett

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings and hearing arguments from the
parties concerning the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss filed July 29, 2004, hereby enters
the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Court Order:
FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The Defendant requested 120-day disposition of the charges in the case at bar
on May 5, 2003. Accordingly, the 120-day period for the State to bring the
Defendant to trial expired on September 2, 2003.
2. The Preliminary Hearing in this matter was scheduled for June 10, 2003. Due
to the high number of preliminary hearings scheduled that day, counsel
stipulated to a continuance of the Preliminary Hearing until July 14, 2003.

t±

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. 031902498
Page2
3. At the Preliminary Hearing on July 14, 2003, counsel stipulated to a
continuance awaiting a determination by the U.S. Attorney's Office whether
federal charges would be filed against the Defendant. Consequently, the
Preliminary Hearing was continued to July 28, 2003.
4. At the Preliminary Hearing on July 28, 2003, counsel stipulated to yet another
continuance relating to the issue of federal charges. The Preliminary Hearing
was continued to August 27, 2003.
5. The Preliminary Hearing on August 27, 2003 was continued to October 8,
2003 because counsel for the Defendant failed to appear.
6. The Preliminary Hearing was held on October 8, 2003 and the Defendant was
bound over for trial. A pretrial conference was scheduled for November 10,
2003 and jury trial was scheduled for November 18, 19, and 20, 2003.
7. At the Pretrial Conference on November 10, the Defendant requested a
continuance of the jury trial. The jury trial was continued to March 24, 25,
and 26 2004.
8. On February 12, 2004, the Defendant filed a motion to continue the trial. The
continuance was granted, a pretrial conference was scheduled for May 24,
2004, and the jury trial was rescheduled for June 8, 9, and 10 2004.
9. At the pretrial conference on May 24, 2004, the Defendant requested leave to
dismiss court appointed counsel and to retain private counsel. The request
was granted and the Defendant was given 60 days to secure counsel. The
Defendant failed to retain private counsel by the date of the scheduling
conference on June 28,2004. On July 12, 2004, The Court appointed conflict

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. 031902498
Page 3
counsel for the Defendant. On July 14, 2004, James Valdez made an
appearance on behalf of the Defendant and informed the Court that the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was forthcoming. A hearing date was set for
the motion and a jury trial was rescheduled for August 24, 25, and 26, 2004.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. There was good cause to delay the Preliminary Hearing from June 10, 2003 to
July 14, 2003 based upon the stipulation of counsel. Such delay is, therefore,
attributable to the Defendant.
2. There was good cause to delay the Preliminary Hearing from July 14, 2003 to
July 28, 2003 based upon the stipulation of counsel awaiting a determination
by the U.S. Attorney's Office whether federal charges would be filed against
the Defendant. Such delay is, therefore, attributable to the Defendant.
3. There was good cause to delay the Preliminary Hearing from July 28, 2003 to
August 27, 2003 based upon the stipulation of counsel relating to the issue of
federal charges. Such delay is, therefore, attributable to the Defendant.
4. There was good cause to delay the Preliminary Hearing from August 27, 2003
to October 8, 2003 based upon defense counsel's failure to appear. Such
delay is, therefore, attributable to the Defendant.
5. There was good cause to delay the trial from November 18, 19, and 20, 2003
until March 24, 25, and 26, 2004 based upon Defendant's request for
continuance. Such delay is, therefore, attributable to the Defendant.

-?un

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. 031902498
Page 4
6. There was good cause to delay the trial from March 24, 25, and 26, 2004 to
June 8, 9, and 10, 2004 based upon Defendant's request for continuance.
Such delay is, therefore, attributable to the Defendant.
7. There was good cause to delay the trial from June 8, 9, and 10, 2004 to
August 24, 25, and 26, 2004 biased upon Defendant's request for new counsel
and for continuance. Such detey is, therefore, attributable to the Defendant.
8. There was good cause to delay the trial from August 24, 25, and 26, 2004 to
December 7, 8, and 9, 2004 based upon Defendant's request for continuance.
9. Thirty-eight days of the 120-day disposition period expired between the date
that the Defendant gave notice of his request for disposition, May 5, 2003, and
the date of the first scheduled Preliminary Hearing, June 10, 2003.
10. Thirty-three days of the 120-day disposition period expired between the date
that the Defendant was bound over for trial, October 8, 2003, and the date of
the first pretrial conference, November 10, 2003.
11. As of the date of the Court's ruling in this matter, August 13, 2003, seventyone days of the 120-day disposition period have expired. Since the Court
finds good cause, due to the Defendant's request for continuance, for delaying
the trial in the case at bar until December 7, 8, and 9, 2004, the State will have
forty-nine days from that date in which to bring the Defendant to trial.

4
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. 031902498
Page 5

ORDER
Based on the foregoingfindingsof fact and conclusions of law, the Court
denies the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
DATED this ^

' day of September, 2004.

The Honorable William W. Barrett
Third District Court Judge
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Case No.

vs.

^MfcuJjT^Q lA&Z&k)
Defendant.
\

^HftuJiJ XVcy/lD U&4OA)

, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been

advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights:
Notification of Charges
I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes:
Degree
Crime & Statutory
Punishment
Provision
Mm/Max and/or
Minimum Mandatory
\
A-

f^LOt^i

0-10,000

ftK*?+%S?t,

O .c-As. 7fr-5
-lot- : «£he
1-=.
as

—=:

l^rQeCdus C?- Lifer. p&&A)
t?L&*i
C>lf)OCV fMF+trl*

~^r*J

I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me, I have read it, or
had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am
pleading guilty (or no contest).
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are:

JfHQXj^ k£*\M$T

~5 liJDlViDUAUS

ID TUf? CoQ&€£? nt>

I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes
listed above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no cpntest, I do not dispute or
contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for
which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty
(or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which.I am pleading guilty
(or no contest):

O^ KP&O^ £, 2&Q^{ 4^lh^y\ 5 , l7#o to - no -gfci-r £^H^ CouAjry
f)P 4 8

Perots

^ o

a^

-TH& Cove^er

Tllbejer&F TU££m&*j&

Waiver of Constitutional Rights
ts
x

I.am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead
guilty (or no contest) I will give up all the following rights:
Counsel: I know that Ihave the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I
cannot afford one, an -attorney will be appointed by thecourt at no cost to me. I understand

that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the
appointed lawyer's service to me.
I ^ ^ ^ o p X h a v e ) waived my rights to counsel. If I have waived my right to counsel,
I have done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons:

If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that
I understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty
(or no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the
consequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s).
If I have not waived my rights to counsel, my attorney is
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of
my guilty (or no contest) plea(s).
. Jury Trial I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an. impartial
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest).
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have
a jury trial, a ) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against
me and b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the
opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me.
Right to. compel witnesses. Iknow that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call
witnesses if Ichose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and
testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the
State would pay those cost.
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to
have a jury trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I
chose not to testify, no one could make-me testify or make me give evidence against myself.
I also know that if I chose not to testify, the juiy would be told that they could not hold my
refusal to testify against me.
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead
guilty (or no contest), I am. presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the
charged crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty,"
and my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving

each element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the
verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty.
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above.
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the
costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up
my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest).
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all
the statutory and constitutional rights as explained above.
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to seicvmg
a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or
both.
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my
crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of
a plea agreement.
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime
involved^ the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run'
at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each
crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing
on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no
contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being
imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was
imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to.impose consecutive sentences
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be
inappropriate.

"v*Ff

Plea bargain. My guilty (or no contest) plea(s)/i^are) (is/are not) the result of a plea
bargain between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and
provisions of the plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those
explained below:
~F>
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Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or
recommendation of probation, or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they
believe the judge may dp are not binding on the judge.
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, of unlawful
influence of any kind have been made to gtt me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises
except those contained in this statement have been made to me.
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to
change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes
because all of the statements are correct.
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
I am^J.years of age. I have attended school through, the U
grade. I can read
and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants
which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under
the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment.
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing
or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea.
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I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must
file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) beforesentence is announced. I understand
that for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea agreement must be
made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest. I will only be allowed to withdraw
my plea if I show that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. I understand that any
challenge to my plea(s) made after sentencing must be.pursued under the PostConviction Remedies Act in Title 78, Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Dated this

y/Uavru
•/fy/rh iT^U
(TWLUfa
DEFENDANT

Certificate of Defense Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney for. ^ H f t y J O l ^ v ^ p C^UO^S _ the defendant
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its
contents and is mentally and physically competent To the best of my knowledge and belief,
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crhne(s) and the factual synopsis of
the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, axe
accurate and true.

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
Bar No. J f e Z ^ b

./I.I

Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against.
, defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant
and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the
offense(s) is. true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage
a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in the
Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the
Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction
of. defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance
of the plea(s) would serve the public interest.

PROSECUHNOATTORNEY
Bar No..

Order
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses
the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely,
knowingly, and voluntarily made.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the
cnme(s) set forth in this Statement be a b a t e d and entered.
Dated this
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
Minute Entry and Order
vs.
Shawn David Larson
Defendant.

Case No. 031902498
Judge William W. Barrett

Defendant filed a Motion For Reinstatement of Direct Appeal; Motion For Appointment
of Counsel on November 8, 2005. These motions have a caption Shawn Larson v. Salt Lake
County District Attorney. Mr. Larson did not provide a copy to the District Attorney.
I have reviewed the file and it is clear that Defendant Larson did not file a Notice of
Appeal. The filing of the motions in November 2005 are not timely in that the time for filing an
appeal expired. Therefore, the motions are denied. This minute entry shall constitute the courts
order.

Dated this 23rd day of March, 2006
BY THE COURT:

JUDGE WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Third Judicial District Court

\JD

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry and Order was
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:

DAVID E. YOCUM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
2001 South State Street, #S3700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190
Inmate Shawn D. Larson, No. 25181
Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT 84020

Dated this 23rd day of March, 2006

Nancy Watkins
Deputy Court Clerk
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